Introduction
In October 2004, in the case of HL v UK 2 , the European Court held that the provisions of the Mental Health Act that allowed incapacitated, compliant individuals to be detained in hospital informally were unlawful, in that there were no detention criteria, there was no formal detention process, and there was no right of access to a Court which could overturn the decision to detain. This was a terrific step forward in the quest to provide legal safeguards for vulnerable people informally detained in institutions. However the decision that HL was detained was based on the specific facts of his case, following the principle articulated in Guzzardi v Italy 3 :
"In order to determine whether someone has been 'deprived of his liberty' within the meaning of Article 5, the starting point must be his concrete situation and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question."
As the facts of HL's case were quite unusual, those caring for people who might fall into the category of the informally detained, and those advising them, were not left with clear guidance to establish whether or not a particular set of circumstances amounted to detention. The consequences of the judgment are particularly problematic for those institutions that are not authorised to detain patients under the Mental Health Act, as, if they find that they are detaining any of their residents, they either have to seek authorisation from the High Court, or register to take detained patients or transfer them to establishments that are so registered. All these options would be expensive or disruptive or both, but nonetheless, the law being the law, one or other of these steps would need to be taken to remain on the right side of the law.
In December 2004 the Department of Health issued draft guidance 4 to NHS bodies and local authorities which would be purchasing or providing care for people likely to be affected by the HL decision. The guidance set out the ways in which those caring for such patients could try and ensure that anyone being 1 Solicitor and partner at Scott-Moncrieff, Harbour and Sinclair (London) 2 (2004) 40 EHRR 761 3 (1980) deprived of their liberty could have their care altered so that they were merely having restrictions placed on their liberty, which would not attract any ECHR requirements for legal safeguards or formal procedures. Curiously, although the guidance pointed out that detention under the MHA would not be available for all those who continued to need to be detained, it only obliquely mentioned the lawful solution to this problem, and appeared to suggest that detaining bodies should be parsimonious in their use of the MHA and perhaps should just sit tight, wait for amending legislation and hope not to get challenged. It is difficult not to get the impression that those drafting the guidance didn't really feel that the safeguards required by the ECtHR were truly necessary to protect vulnerable people.
At the time that the HL case was going through the domestic courts, the Department of Health estimated that some 48,000 people would be affected by the outcome. So where have all these people gone? One possibility is that a huge effort was made to ensure that nearly all the 48,000 had their care plans amended to ensure that they were no longer deprived of their liberty, and the few that were sectioned were those for whom there really was no alternative.
The other possibility, which seems more likely, is that the country's hospitals and care homes are still full of unlawfully detained, vulnerable and mentally incapacitated people, many of them in places with very limited official oversight. DE was placed by SCC initially at the X home and, since 14 November 2005, at the Y home. Throughout the time that DE was away from home he wanted to return, and his wife, JE wanted him back, and both had said so to anyone who would listen and many who would not. In the end JE went to court to get her husband home. The Official Solicitor represented DE's interests. The court considered whether in all the circumstances DE had been "deprived of his liberty", as "essentially a question of fact, to be considered in the light of all the circumstances and focussing upon the "concrete situation of the individual concerned" -here DE...." 9 .
The Judgment
The Signor Guzzardei was a suspected mafiosi required to live within an area of about 2.5 sq km on an island just off the coast of Sardinia. Leaving aside the circumstantial details, there are many points of similarity between the accumulated restrictions placed on Signor Guzzardi and those that applied to DE.
Mr. Guzzardi was housed in part of the hamlet of Cala Reale which consisted mainly of the buildings of a former medical establishment, a carabinieri station, a school and a chapel. He lived there principally in the company of other persons subjected to the same measure and of policemen. The area around which he could move far exceeded the dimensions of a cell and was not bounded by any physical barrier, but there were few opportunities for social contacts other than with his near family, his fellow "residents" and the supervisory staff. Supervision was carried out strictly and on an almost constant basis. Thus, Mr. Guzzardi was not able to leave his dwelling between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. without giving prior notification to the authorities in due time. He had to report to the authorities twice a day and inform them of the name and number of his correspondent whenever he wished to use the telephone. He needed the consent of the authorities for trips off the island which were rare and made under the strict supervision of the carabinieri. He was liable to punishment by "arrest" if he failed to comply with any of his obligations. The 2006 hearing of JE v DE dealt only with the question of whether there had been a deprivation of liberty, and a further hearing will consider the lawfulness of that deprivation of liberty . One would hope that the Government would welcome the clarity that this judgment brings to the definition of deprivation of liberty, but, as it will undoubtedly throw out current calculations about the cost of implementing the Bournewood Gap proposals, I would not be enormously surprised if it intervenes to seek to have the decision overturned.
However it is the behaviour of Surrey County Council and the care home staff in this case that should be a real wake-up call to the Government that it would be rash to ignore.
The evidence that DE wanted to return home to be with his wife was overwhelming; the judgment quotes many examples of DE having made his wishes absolutely clear. The judgment also quotes from the records relating to DE, from which it is clear that the staff at Y home understood that they had both the right and the duty to prevent DE going home, and could restrict JE's access to him to ensure that she did not simply take him home. This position was communicated to JE, who was told, and understood, that if she attempted to take her husband home the police would be called.
However in her witness statement the manager of the Y home, Ms Soper, claimed that she was well aware that neither she nor the police could prevent JE from taking DE home, and that when she had referred to calling the police if JE sought to do so she meant that:
" the police would be called to inform them that a vulnerable adult was being removed from [the Y home]. I would not ask the police (and the police would not be able) to prevent [JE] from removing [DE] from [the Y home]." (para101).
The judge commented:
"Mr Bowen submits tartly that these assertions belie the evidence, not least that filed by SCC itself. As he points out, some of the care notes kept by the Y home are actually signed by Ms Soper herself, including for example, as I have already mentioned, the very first note I referred to in paragraph [90] above: "[DE] continually requested to go home with [JE]. I have informed him he cannot leave, neither can [JE] take him home." In fact, during his cross-examination of her, Mr Bowen got Ms Soper to accept that she had told DE that he could not leave to return home with JE, just as she confirmed her understanding that DE was not free to go home with his wife." (para 102).
And: An attempt to place DE under guardianship failed when JE refused to consent to this, and the County Council made no other attempt to regularise the position, until in the end JE issued proceedings just over 10 months after DE was admitted to residential care.
" In the light of this substantial and consistent volume of material it seems to me that DE quite plainly was not 'free to leave' the X home and has not been and is not
So it would seem that Surrey ignored its own legal advice that it needed to obtain authority to detain DE; kept DE in residential care by misleading DE into believing that he was not entitled to go home and JE into believing that it had the right to prevent her from taking DE home, and then brazenly attempted to argue in court that it had never attempted to mislead either JE or DE.
Comment
The long awaited legislation to deal with the HL judgment will amend the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to require care homes and hospitals to seek authority to detain incapacitated people who need to be detained and will require PCT's and local authorities to authorise such detentions, following a full assessment. 14 There will be no independent judicial assessment, for instance by the equivalent of the MHRT, unless a concerned person, such as JE makes an application to the Court of Protection. In effect those involved in the process will be trusted to administer it properly and will rarely be challenged, as people with the determination of JE, and with her willingness to challenge the authorities, are, understandably, thin on the ground.
JE put DE in the street because she couldn't look after him without help, and the help she received from the local authority was either absent or insufficient. Leaving aside the obvious fact that if help to the value of the cost of DE's residential care had been available, JE probably could have managed fine, it is also important to look at the way in which financial considerations are bound to distort "in principle" decisions about whether someone is being, or needs to be, detained.
It is intended that people in residential care will be means-tested, even if they are detained. This is, of course, obnoxious, as no other detained person has to pay for his or her detention in this country, and DE's case makes very clear the inextricable inter-relationship between the care part of the package and the detention part of it. Therefore there is bound to be a calculation as to whether it would be cheaper to detain someone if the equity in his/her house can then be brought into the means-testing calculation, rather than to offer them care in their own home. Once in the care home it may be financially attractive to care for them in conditions amounting to detention as a justification for higher charges (particularly as the Government has agreed to re-imburse the cost of the authorisation process). Even if the person's detention can be justified, it is possible that in independent homes he or she will be paying over the odds for the detention/care, as it is openly acknowledged that self-funders are often charged far more (often about £50-£100 but in some cases it can be as much as £200 per week) 15 , than those funded by the local authority. One care home provider gave information to the Wanless Report detailing the difference between the local authority base line fees and what the home charged self funders in three southern authorities. The difference ranged between £133 per week and £219 per week. Anecdotally it is reported that some care providers are willing to confirm that this premium subsidises the cost of caring for statefunded residents. In their 2005 report 'Care Homes for Older People in the UK -a Market Study', the Office of Fair Trading reported that one in five homes were charging more than local authority funded residents for a similar package of care.
Unless guidance makes it clear that it would be unacceptable, someone moving to residential care from a period of s3 inpatient treatment may be detained under the MCA in preference to being cared for under s117 (which of course only applies when someone 'ceases to be detained'), because s117 aftercare is not means-tested.
An incapacitated person without relatives could have an employee of the local authority appointed as his or her deputy, and the same local authority may be the provider of the care home in which the person is detained and the body authorising detention. How many incapacitated people like DE will be detained against their will and have their homes sold from under them when the MCA kicks in? It seems likely that it is happening in an unofficial way already (why should public bodies that are willing to ignore the law on detention be too fussy about funding?) and the the MCA, once the Bournewood provisions come in, will make it even easier to subsume the interests of the vulnerable individual to the interests of the public body.
Of course many, probably most, providers of care, PCTs and local authorities will do their best to comply with the law as they understand it, but this case illustrates the risks of trusting public bodies to act scrupulously -the law reports are littered with many other examples. Furthermore, even those that follow the law to the letter will be dependent on the statutory assessments which will made by health and social work professionals, as to whether the individual is detained and whether the detention is necessary. Mr Justice Munby's judgment in this case is enormously helpful, but nonetheless there remain many areas of opacity and it will be up to individual professionals to interpret the guidance as best they can. The fact that they are not legally qualified isn't particularly a problem (after all it is not as if the lawyers, as a profession, have displayed any great evidence of understanding the principles), but it is a problem that there will be so many assessors, and that generally their decisions will not be subject to the routine judicial scrutiny that leads, over time, to consistency in decision-making.
The case of Mr and Mrs E displays the problems in the proposed legislation in all their grisly inadequacy. Luckily, the provisions are not due to be implemented until April 2008 (at the earliest), so it is not too late for the government to bring in proper safeguards.
Automatic tribunals are probably not necessary, but the alternative must be a robust advocacy system, not only for the unbefriended, but for all incapacitated people in residential or hospital care, so that it is not left to relatives to have to identify between: those who are informally detained who shouldn't be detained; those who are informally detained who should be detained under the MCA or MHA: those who are detained under the MCA and should be under the MHA; those who are detained under the MCA and shouldn't be detained at all; those who are detained in residential care who should be receiving services at home; and those who are correctly detained under the MCA. Without such independent, professional, scrutiny, the new law will inevitably lead to scandals of wrongful detention and financial abuse being added to the scandals of abuse in care abuse such as those identified in Cornwall 16 and Sutton and Merton. 17 Contrariwise, a robust system of personal advocacy will not only reduce the risk of people being wrongly detained and overcharged, but will also reduce abuse in residential care across the board, which is surely what all of this, including the ECHR, is ultimately intended to ensure.
'Joint investigation into the provision of services for people with learning disabilities at Cornwall Partnership NHS Trust', Commission for Social Care Inspection and
Healthcare Commission (July 2006) 17 'Investigation into the service for people with learning disabilities provided by Sutton and Merton PCT' Healthcare Commission (January 2007) 
